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Abstract
This article analyzes the immediate impact on First Amendment
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court's "direct causal link"
requirement adopted in 2011 in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association. In embracing an empirically focused proof-of-causation
doctrine, Brown marked the first time in the Court's history it had
used the phrase "direct causal link" in any free speech case. But just
one year later, in a very different factual context in United States v.
Alvarez, the Court struck down a federal law making it a crime to lie
about earning military medals. In December 2012, a federal judge
used Brown's "direct causal link" test to enjoin a California law that
prohibits healthcare providers from engaging in sexual orientation
change efforts with gay minors. This article explores problems with
adopting Brown's quantitative and empirical causation standard in
cases like Alvarez where an intangible injury (reputational harm) to
an inanimate object (a medal) is the alleged compelling interest.
Bridging doctrine with theory, the article also examines how the
direct causal link requirement comports with the marketplace of ideas
theory upon which much of First Amendment jurisprudence is
premised.
I. Introduction
In December 2012, U.S. District Court Judge William B. Shubb
issued a preliminary injunction in Welch v. Brown' preventing
California from enforcing2 a recently enacted law that prohibits
1. Welch v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172029, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012).
2. The preliminary injunction applied only to the three plaintiffs in Welch, with
Judge Shubb writing that "defendants are hereby enjoined from enforcing the provisions
of SB 1172 (to be codified at Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 865-865.2) as against plaintiffs
Donald Welch, Anthony Duk, and Aaron Bitzer." Id. at *56. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Ban
on Gay-to-Straight Therapy for Children Halted, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, at A6
(reporting that "two mental health professionals and a man who said he benefited from
SOCE argued that S.B. 1172 would impede their efforts to offer SOCE and chilled their
rights to free speech," and noting that "Judge William B. Shubb agreed and enjoined the
law from being enforced-but only on the three plaintiffs.") (emphasis added).
In a separate lawsuit challenging California's SOCE law, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in December 2012 granted an emergency motion for an
injunction pending appeal. Order, Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012),
available at http://coop.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2012/12/21/PickupInjunction.
pdf. That emergency injunction came less than one month after U.S. District Judge
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mental health providers in the Golden State from engaging in sexual
orientation change efforts ("SOCE")3 with minors.' Sometimes
referred to as conversion therapy, reparative therapy, or reorientation
therapy,' SOCE typically involve "a set of varied psychological and
therapeutic interventions that have as their primary objective the
alteration of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals' sexual
orientation from one that is homosexual in nature to one that is
predominantly heterosexual." 6 The California statute in Welch - the
first of its kind in the nation -was "celebrated as a milestone by
advocates for gay rights."'
Judge Shubb's ruling, along with another decision in a separate
case challenging the same measure,' garnered significant national
media attention.o Such interest likely was due to the controversial
Kimberly J. Mueller denied a motion for a preliminary injunction in the case. Pickup v.
Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172034 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4,2012).
3. California defines SOCE to encompass "any practices by mental health providers
that seek to change an individual's sexual orientation. This includes efforts to change
behaviors or gender expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions
or feelings toward individuals of the same sex." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 865(b)(1)
(2013).
4. The law provides that "[u]nder no circumstances shall a mental health provider
engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a patient under 18 years of age." CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (2013).
5. See Michelle Beaver, Can Gays be 'Cured'? Controversial Practice Attempts Just
That, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, at Mar. 20, 2011, available at LexisNexis Academic
news database (reporting that "reparative therapy, sometimes called conversion therapy,
change therapy and reorientation therapy, attempts to change people from homosexual or
bisexual to heterosexual. The therapy can be carried out through several means, ranging
from prayer to counseling sessions, and can sometimes include aversion techniques").
6. Robert J. Cramer et al., Weighing the Evidence: Empirical Assessment and Ethical
Implications of Conversion Therapy, 18 ETHICS & BEHAV. 93, 94 (2008). A 2009 report
issued by the American Psychological Association concluded that "the results of
scientifically valid research indicate that it is unlikely that individuals will be able to
reduce same-sex attractions or increase other-sex sexual attractions through SOCE."
American Psychological Association, Report of the American Psychological Association
Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation 3 (2009)
[hereinafter APA Report], available at http://www.apa.org/pillgbt/resources/therapeutic-
response.pdf.
7. See Press Release, Senator Ted W. Lieu, California to Become First State to
Crack Down on Bogus 'Gay Cures' for Minors (Sept. 30, 2012), available at
http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2012-09-30-california-become-first-state-crack-down-bogus-
'gay-cures-minors (asserting that the statute "makes California the first state to end now-
discredited attempts to change a minor's sexual orientation").
8. Erik Eckholm, Gay 'Conversion Therapy' Faces Test in Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
28, 2012, at A18.
9. Pickup v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172034 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
10. See Erik Eckholm, Clashing Rulings Complicate Path of Gay 'Conversion
Therapy' Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at A16 (reporting on Judge Shubb's decision in
Welch and that of another federal judge in a separate case challenging the same law); Bob
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and contested nature of SOCE" and the combustible combination of
political, religious, psychiatric, and cultural forces that surround
them.12
From a free speech, First Amendment" jurisprudence
perspective, what makes Judge Shubb's decision ripe for analysis is, as
described later,14 its reliance on the causation-of-harm logic embraced
in 2011 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association.15  In that case, the Court declared
unconstitutional a California statute banning the sale of violent video
games to minors."
Egelko, Differing Verdicts on 'Gay Therapy,' S.F. CHRON., Dec. 5, 2012, at C1 (reporting
that Judge Shubb determined the law "punishes therapists because of the content of their
speech to a patient"); Patrick McGreevy, Fate of Conversion Therapy Ban Unclear After
2nd Judge Weighs In, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at AA1 (reporting that Judge Shubb
concluded the law "may inhibit the 1st Amendment rights of therapists who oppose
homosexuality. He issued an injunction barring the state from enforcing the measure
against three plaintiffs who sued to block it, until he can make a broader ruling on its
merits").
11. See Shankar Vedantam, Studies on Gays Yield Conflicting Findings, WASH. POST,
May 9, 2001, at A13 (describing how "the controversial practice of trying to change the
sexual orientation of gay men and lesbians have produced conflicting findings on the
effectiveness of such therapy," and adding that "all major medical groups have advised
against attempts to persuade gay men and lesbians to seek treatment, noting that such
attempts can be psychologically damaging. But some religious groups have waged a
campaign over the past three years to convert gays to heterosexuality through
counseling").
12. See Jack Drescher, Ethical Concerns Raised When Patients Seek to Change Same-
Sex Attractions, 5 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 181, 183 (2001) (noting that "[t]he
political nature of this issue has been addressed in professional journals," and adding that
"the reparative therapy debate has moved out of the professional arena and into the
cultural one. It has included advertisements in major newspapers promoting religious
'cures' for homosexuality"); Loreto R. Prieto, Conversion Therapy, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COUNSELING, VOLUME 3, 114 (Frederick T. L. Leong ed. 2008) (noting that "[p]roponents
and practitioners of conversion therapy base the rationale for such intervention on
medical, moral, or religious traditions that regard homosexuality and homosexual
behaviors as unnatural, psychopathological, or morally transgressive").
13. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were
incorporated nearly ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and
officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
14. See infra Part I, Section B.
15. Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
16. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1746.1 (a) (2011) (providing that "[a] person may not sell
or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video game to a minor"). Another
aspect of the law that also was struck down in Brown required that "[e]ach violent video
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In explaining why the law violated the First Amendment for the
five-justice majority" in Brown, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review to which content-based laws
are subject" demands proof of a "direct causal link"" between the
speech in question and an "actual problem" 20 allegedly resulting from
it.21
Pointing out that "ambiguous proof will not suffice,"2 Justice
Scalia emphasized that the social science studies proffered by
California "do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act
aggressively."" Furthermore, proof of a positive correlation 24
between speech and harm is not sufficient for a statute to pass
game that is imported into or distributed in California for retail sale shall be labeled with a
solid white '18' outlined in black. The '18' shall have dimensions of no less than 2 inches
by 2 inches" CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1746.2 (2011).
17. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732 (noting that Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the
opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan).
18. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (opining that because the California statute "imposes a
restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny-that is, unless it is justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest"). See United States v.
Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (opining that a content-based restriction on
expression "can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny," and explaining that "[i]f a statute
regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest"); see also Joel Timmer, Violence as Obscenity:
Offensiveness and the First Amendment, 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 28 (2010) (observing
that "[u]nder strict scrutiny, the government must show that a restriction is necessary to
achieve a compelling government interest and that the restriction is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end").
19. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
20. See id. (asserting that "[tihe State must specifically identify an 'actual problem' in
need of solving") (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 822
(2000)).
21. Id. at 2738-39.
22. Id. at 2739 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. A correlation is:
an empirical relationship between two variables such that (1) changes in
one are associated with changes in the other or (2) particular attributes
of one variable are associated with particular attributes of the other.
Correlation in and of itself does not constitute a causal relationship
between the two variables, but it is one criterion of causality.
EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 90 (11th ed., 2007). A positive
correlation, in turn, "means that two variables move, or change, in the same direction. If
one variable goes up, the other tends to also; if it goes down, the other does too."
LAWRENCE R. FREY ET AL., INVESTIGATING COMMUNICATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
RESEARCH METHODS 357 (2d ed., 2000).
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constitutional muster under Brown." Viewed collectively and
interpreted in their most free speech friendly form, all of these
statements from Brown mandate that, under strict scrutiny, the
government must unambiguously prove the existence of an actual
problem directly caused by regulated speech.26 Per one appellate
court's interpretation, Brown requires the government to offer
"compelling evidence" of effects.27
Professor R. George Wright recently characterized Brown's
approach as "a highly demanding strict scrutiny test"2 8 that leads to a
"rigorous application of strict scrutiny."2 9 Furthermore, Professor
Deana Pollard Sacks writes that it is an analysis that focuses "on
whether causation was sufficiently proven to support a state's
compelling interest."30
The bottom line from Brown is that California simply could not
prove the existence of an actual problem caused by speech that
required legal redress. California's statute, to borrow a fine phrase
from University of Chicago constitutional law scholar Geoffrey
25. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739 (remarking that the studies offered as evidence of
harm by California "have been rejected by every court to consider them, and with good
reason" because "[t]hey show at best some correlation between exposure to violent
entertainment and minuscule real-world effects") (emphasis added).
26. As interpreted by one federal appellate court, the Supreme Court in Brown
"determined that the evidence offered by California did not prove that violent video
games actually caused minors to act aggressively, and thus the statute did not survive strict
scrutiny." Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1125, n.8 (10th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis added).
27. Saint John's Church in the Wilderness v. Scott, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 639, *13
(Colo. App. Apr. 26, 2012). In Scott, which involved a question regarding whether
gruesome images on antiabortion posters can psychologically harm minors who view them,
the Colorado Court of Appeals did not apply Brown's proof-of-causation doctrine and
instead emphasized that "[f]ower federal courts have concluded that exposure to graphic
images can cause such psychological harm." Id. at *29. In addition to relying on judicial
precedent finding causation of harm, the appellate court noted that the trial court judge in
Scott, in a 2008 ruling predating the Supreme Court's Brown decision by several years,
decided that the "posters caused or could cause psychological harm." Id. at *30. The
appellate court furthermore emphasized that "different psychological harm is at issue" in
Scott, leading it to conclude that "defendants' reliance on Brown to argue that First
Amendment protection of violent video games now requires that we reconsider the role
which protecting children played in the trial court is misplaced." Id. at *13.
28. R. George Wright, Judicial Line-Drawing and the Broader Culture: The Case of
Politics and Entertainment, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341, 344 (2012).
29. Id. at 345.
30. Deana Pollard Sacks, Constitutionalized Negligence, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1065,
1117 (2012).
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Stone, amounted to "a law in search of a problem."" California
failed, in Justice Scalia's terms, to "identify an 'actual problem' in
need of solving."32 An actual problem in Brown would have existed
only if it were established by empirical, quantitative, and causal
evidence."
Brown's demanding proof-of-causation doctrine34 is, of course, a
far more speech-protective standard than the flexible bad tendency
doctrine that developed nearly a century ago in the context of
seditious libel. Justice Scalia, however, did not specify in Brown
whether the proof-of-causation doctrine was limited to cases
involving media products like video games, movies, and television
programs or whether it could be or should be extended to all free
expression cases involving content-based laws subject to strict
scrutiny.
In other words, should Brown's proof-of-causation doctrine be
confined to similar factual contexts involving statutes limiting the
availability of media artifacts and in which social science data are
deployed to demonstrate harm purportedly caused by those
products? Or, conversely, should Brown's standard be applied to
different and diverse scenarios-those not involving either media
products or social science evidence? This latter possible extension of
the doctrine would be similar to how the incitement-to-violence test
developed by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio16 has been
31. Geoffrey R. Stone, Mass Media in the Twenty-First Century: Prosecuting the Press
for Publishing Classified Information, 2 FlU L. REV. 93, 95 (2006/2007).
32. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529
U.S. 803, 822 (2000)).
33. See generally Dennis K. Davis, History of Research Methods, RESEARCH
METHODS IN COMMUNICATION 21, 21 (Shuhua Zhou & Win. David Sloan eds., 2d ed.
2011) (asserting that "[e]mpirical methods rely on data derived from observations. They
are distinguishable from approaches that rely on reasoning, logic, or intuition only.
Quantitative methods produce numerically based measurements of object attributes that
can be subjected to numerical, statistical analysis").
34. See Clay Calvert et al., Social Science, Media Effects & The Supreme Court: Is
Communication Research Relevant After Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association?,
19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 293, 310 (2012) (characterizing the test adopted in Brown as "an
extremely rigorous standard that demands both causation and certitude, as well as large
effects that actually possess real-world significance").
35. See Christina E. Wells, Lies, Honor, and the Government's Good Name: Seditious
Libel and the Stolen Valor Act, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 136, 152 (2012) (asserting that
"[diuring the seditious libel era, government officials used the bad tendency test to judge
whether speech might lead to harm by causing bad opinions of the government or
government initiatives. Such malleable tests gave officials enormous discretion to silence
speech arbitrarily by claiming it might harm national security").
36. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Court in Brandenburg held that
the First Amendment does "not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
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stretched from its in-person, Klan-rally factual moorings37 to apply
today to wrongful death and negligence cases in which makers of
media products are targets of legal blame.38
To begin to address these questions, Part II of this article
illustrates the nearly immediate expansion of Brown's proof-of-
causation doctrine beyond the factual confines of that case to other
scenarios involving content-based statutory restrictions on speech."
In particular, it argues that the Supreme Court's 2012 plurality
opinion in United States v. Alvarez40 reinforced the actual-problem
and proof-of-causation doctrines, thereby giving the green light for
lower courts to adopt them in a wide range of possible situations.
Yet, Part II also ponders possible problems with adopting Brown's
quantitative and empirical causation standard in cases such as
Alvarez, where an intangible injury (reputational harm) to an
inanimate object (a Medal of Honor) is the alleged compelling
interest.
Part III then explains that although the proof-of-causation
doctrine arguably flows naturally from a vigorous version of the
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447.
37. See id. at 444-48 (involving the prosecution of the leader of a Ku Klux Klan group
for giving a racist speech during a farm-held Klan rally that involved a cross burning).
38. See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (involving a lawsuit
targeting the manufacturers of violent video games and the producers of the movie "The
Basketball Diaries" for creating media products that allegedly caused a minor to engage in
a school shooting in Paducah, Kentucky, and opining that federal courts "have generally
demanded that all expression, advocacy or not, meet the Brandenburg test before its
regulation for its tendency to incite violence is permitted"); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249
Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (applying the test developed in Brandenburg to a case
in which the music of John "Ozzy" Osbourne allegedly caused a young man to commit
suicide); see generally Juliet Dee, Basketball Diaries, Natural Born Killers and School
Shootings: Should There be Limits on Speech Which Triggers Copycat Violence?, 77 DENV.
U. L. REV. 713, 715-18 (2000) (explaining that in many civil lawsuits filed against film
producers and other makers of media products, "courts have refused to consider whether
the media were 'negligent"' and, instead, have applied Brandenburg's incitement test, and
asserting that "[i]t is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to prove . .. that
the media outlet intended for the violence to occur, thus resulting in a failure to meet the
second part of the Brandenburg test and a judgment in favor of the media defendant.");
Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media
Violence Tort Cases?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1 (2000) (examining the problems with applying
the Brandenburg test to media-violence contexts).
39. See Part II, infra .
40. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
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venerable marketplace of ideas theory of free expression, 1 the
doctrine does nothing to resolve normative questions about whether
speech merits protection even when it is clear that speech causes
harm.42 The article uses the Supreme Court's 2011 opinion in Snyder
v. Phelps43-handed down less than four months before Brown-to
illustrate this point. Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting that
courts weighing the possible use of an empirical, direct causal link test
like that in Brown consider several questions before adopting it."
II. EXPANDING THE PROOF-OF-CAUSATION DOCTRINE:
FROM BROWNTO ALVAREZ AND BEYOND
The first part of this section examines the U.S. Supreme Court's
plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in United
States v. Alvarez. The second part of this section then analyzes how
some lower courts-most notably, Judge Shubb in Welch v. Brown-
have used Brown's stringent proof-of-causation doctrine as a
powerful free speech tool held by the judiciary to beat back censorial
efforts by government entities.
A. An Unwise Deployment of Brown in Alvarez?
On June 28, 2012, just one year and a day after its ruling in
Brown, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v.
Alvarez." At issue was a portion of a federal statute known as the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005 that made it a crime to lie about having won
military medals.46 The case centered on the indictment of Xavier
41. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6-8
(1993) (providing a concise overview of the goals, strengths and weaknesses of the
marketplace of ideas theory).
42. See Part II, infra.
43. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
44. See Part IV, infra.
45. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537.
46. The statute at issue provided:
Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to
have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for
the Armed Forces of the United States, any of the service medals or
badges awarded to the members of such forces, the ribbon, button, or
rosette of any such badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable
imitation of such item shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than six months, or both.
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Alvarez, who lied about earning a Congressional Medal of Honor
while introducing himself at a water district board meeting.47 In
announcing the judgment of the Court in a four-justice plurality
opinion, Anthony Kennedy held that the statute "infringes upon
speech protected by the First Amendment. "4
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the
government could not satisfy strict scrutiny-he referred to it as
"exacting scrutiny" 49-because, in part, it could not demonstrate the
existence of an actual problem directly caused by lying about earning
military medals.o Although the government alleged a compelling
interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor, Justice
Kennedy observed that "to recite the Government's compelling
interests is not to end the matter."" Put more bluntly, recitation of a
problem and proof of a problem are two very different matters.
Citing Brown, Kennedy articulated the test the government
needed to satisfy, as well as the link it could not prove:
There must be a direct causal link between the restriction
imposed and the injury to be prevented.... The link between
the Government's interest in protecting the integrity of the
military honors system and the Act's restriction on the false
claims of liars like respondent has not been shown.52
Again citing Brown for "cf." support, Kennedy wrote that "[t]he
Government points to no evidence to support its claim that the
public's general perception of military awards is diluted by false
claims such as those made by Alvarez.""
Justice Kennedy's conclusion in Alvarez that "the lack of a causal
link between the Government's stated interest and the [Stolen Valor]
18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012). After the Supreme Court decided Alvarez, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a different portion of the statute-namely, 18 U.S.C.
§ 704(a) (2012)-that prohibits the wearing of military medals without authorization and
with an intent to deceive. United States v. Perelman, 695 F.3d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 2012).
47. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542.
48. Id. at 2551.
49. Id. at 2548.
50. See id. at 2549 (finding that "[t]he lack of a causal link between the Government's
stated interest and the Act is not the only way in which the Act is not actually necessary to
achieve the Government's stated interest.").
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted).
53. Id. at 2540.
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Act"" was a key reason for its invalidity is significant for several
reasons. First, it illustrates that Brown's proof-of-causation doctrine
for establishing actual problems applies to cases involving not simply
mediated speech embodied in products such as video games, but also
to situations involving in-person, face-to-face verbal expression like
Xavier Alvarez's duplicitous remarks at a public meeting.
Second, and related to this first point of contrast, is the fact that
while Brown pivoted on alleged harms to humans, namely minors,"
Alvarez centered on purported intangible injuries-specifically,
preserving "the integrity and purpose of the Medal"" and, more
generally, "protecting the integrity of the military honors system" -
to inanimate objects (medals). In other words, not only is the nature
of the injury itself radically different (psychological and physical harm
versus what amounts to reputational harm) between Brown and
Alvarez, but so too is the object upon which it is inflicted (a human
being versus a metal-and-ribbon decoration). Applying Brown's
proof-of-causation doctrine to Alvarez's facts thus seems somewhat
akin to jamming a square peg into a round hole.
Ultimately, Alvarez (via Brown) explicitly required the
government to prove "a direct causal link"" between speech and
harm in a factual scenario where efficacious social science evidence of
causation was nearly impossible to conduct. While Justice Kennedy
concluded that the government offered "no evidence" 9 to prove that
lying about military medals dilutes how they are perceived, he failed
to suggest or explain what evidence, either in kind or quantity, might
suffice to satisfy "the Government's heavy burden"a or how that
evidence might be collected, gathered, and/or demonstrated.
Must the government offer survey evidence about people's
opinions regarding military medals in light of individuals who lie
about possessing them? Survey research would only provide
descriptive, associational data about people's opinions or views, not
54. Id. at 2549.
55. See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) (noting that
"California relies primarily on the research of Dr. Craig Anderson and a few other
research psychologists whose studies purport to show a connection between exposure to
violent video games and harmful effects on children") (emphasis added).
56. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543.
57. Id. at 2549.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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the direct causal link that both Brown and Alvarez mandate.61 A
longitudinal panel study might begin to tap into this, but such studies
carry problems.62 Ultimately, as Professor John Reinard writes,
"[s]urvey studies just try to identify associations among variables, but
experiments add experimental variables to the existing setting to see
what effects might be found.""
How, in turn, one (such as the federal government in Alvarez)
would design an experiment to prove a direct causal link between
lying about earning medals and the reputational integrity of them is
unclear, at best. Justice Kennedy, for one, failed to offer any
possibilities or suggestions. Furthermore, one experiment alone
would not suffice to prove causation; multiple experiments are
needed to replicate and verify findings.'
Justice Kennedy's appropriation of the proof-of-causation
doctrine from Brown-a case in which social science was plentiful,
albeit insufficient-to a different scenario that doesn't readily lend
itself to empirical evidence reveals a danger in grounding legal
doctrines in social science principles. The reality is that in
communication research, "causality is very difficult to establish.""
All of this raises a very important, yet disturbing, possibility. In
particular, it could be that when Justice Kennedy deployed the phrase
61. See JOANN KEYTON, COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: ASKING QUESTIONS,
FINDING ANSWERS 182 (3d ed. 2011) (observing that "[o]ne of the weaknesses of using
questionnaires or surveys as the only data collection method is that the data produced are
largely descriptive and can only describe relationships between variables," and adding that
"it is difficult to demonstrate that one variable caused a change in another variable").
62. See generally H. RUSSELL BERNARD, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS:
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 246-47 (2d ed. 2013) (observing that
"[i]n a panel study, you interview the same people again and again. This makes panel
studies like experiments: Participants are tracked for their exposure or lack of exposure to
a series of interventions in the real world," and pointing out the problem of attrition that
can occur with panel studies).
63. JOHN C. REINARD, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 396 (4th
ed. 2008). See JENNINGS BRYANT & SUSAN THOMPSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MEDIA
EFFECTS 15 (2002) (asserting that "surveys are very good for determining associations or
relationships between variables, but they are less compelling for determining cause and
effect").
64. See BERNARD, supra note 62, at 94 (explaining how "[clontinual replication and
verification produce cumulative knowledge, with high external validity-that is,
knowledge that you can generalize to people who were not part of your experiment," and
asserting that "[rieplication of knowledge is every bit as important as its production in the
first place. In fact, in terms of usefulness, replicated knowledge is exactly what we're
after").
65. FREY, supra note 24, at 41.
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"direct causal link" in Alvarez, he used it as a term of art and did not
intend it to mean direct proof of causation of harm in a Brown-like
social scientific sense. In other words, there could be a critical
disconnect between Kennedy's meaning of "direct causal link" and
social scientists' understanding of that term. Yet in Brown, it was
clear that Justice Scalia focused on the difference between causation
and correlation in spurning California's social science studies.'
What is the history of the phrase "direct causal link" in
American jurisprudence? Rather remarkably, the phrase "direct
causal link" appears in only six U.S. Supreme Court opinions
predating Brown and Alvarez, none of which involved an alleged
violation of the First Amendment freedom of speech. In fact, the
first time that the high court ever used the phrase "direct causal link"
was relatively recently in its 1989 opinion in City of Canton v. Harris.68
In City of Canton, the Court had "to determine if a municipality can
ever be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations
resulting from its failure to train municipal employees."69 Writing for
the majority, Justice Byron White asserted that "our first inquiry in
any case alleging municipal liability under section 1983 is the question
whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or
custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.""o The Court next
used the phrase in 1992 in another section 1983 action, this one
involving the issue of whether that statute provides "a remedy for a
municipal employee who is fatally injured in the course of his
employment because the city customarily failed to train or warn its
employees about known hazards in the workplace.""
By 1997, it became clear that the phrase "direct causal link" was
an integral part of the Court's municipal liability jurisprudence.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that year that "a plaintiff must
show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of
culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights." 72 Two years
later, however, the Supreme Court used the phrase "direct causal
66. See notes 19-23 supra, and accompanying text.
67. See notes 67-78, supra, and accompanying text.
68. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
69. Id. at 380.
70. Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
71. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 117 (1992). The Court in Collins
favorably quoted City of Canton language verbatim regarding the direct causal link
requirement. Id. at 123.
72. Bd. Cnty. Comm'rs Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis
added).
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link" for the first time in a very different context in INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre.7 1 In Aguirre-Aguirre, it was used to describe the connection
between a crime and its alleged political purpose or object.74
In 2006, Justice Clarence Thomas used the phrase in another
very different sense and context-namely, a Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act case called Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply
Corp.75  In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice Thomas wrote: "To use a physical metaphor, ordinary
competitive actions undertaken by the defendant competitor cut the
direct causal link between the plaintiff competitor's injuries and the
forbidden acts."
The last use of the phrase "direct causal link" by the Supreme
Court prior to its deployment in the First Amendment contexts of
Brown and Alvarez occurred in March 2011-just three months
before Brown-in Connick v. Thompson.7 In fact, it was utilized in
Connick by Justice Antonin Scalia, the same justice who authored the
majority opinion in Brown and who used it again there. Rather than
dealing with the effects of violent video games, however, Connick
involved the potential liability of a district attorney for allegedly
failing to properly train his assistant district attorneys about "their
duty to produce exculpatory evidence."78 Justice Scalia merely used
the phrase in quoting from another section 1983 opinion described
above.79
The bottom line, then, is that the phrase "direct causal link" is
brand new within the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence, having only entered the doctrinal lexicon in Brown and
Alvarez. Given such infancy, it might simply be that the meaning of
the phrase is still in a stage of judicial fermentation and thus is
unsettled.
Another possibility is that the direct-causal-link doctrine means
different things in different settings, depending on the susceptibility
73. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
74. Id. at 432.
75. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006).
76. Id. at 482 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
77. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
78. Id. at 1355.
79. Id. at 1368 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Bd. Cnty. Comm'rs Bryan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
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of an alleged "actual problem" to empirical proof or, as addressed
later in Part II, the egregiousness of the alleged injury. Or, could it
perhaps just mean that "direct causal link" is not even a doctrine at
all, but a slippery phrase deployed loosely by justices and one that
should not be used at all in some cases? It is important to recall here
Justice Antonin Scalia's assertion in 2009 in Federal Communications
Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." that:
[t]here are some propositions for which scant empirical
evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of
broadcast profanity on children is one of them. One cannot
demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some children
are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts (and
insulated from all other indecency), and others are shielded
from all indecency."
That quotation represents a definite chink in the empirical,
proof-of-causation armor shielding free speech in both Brown and
Alvarez. The application of Brown's proof-of-causation doctrine in
Alvarez, however, is indicative of what Professor Timothy Zick calls
"a widespread empirical turn, a quantitative mood swing"' in
constitutional law. He asserts that "[c]onstitutional empiricism is
more than a judicial reliance on data-it is the process by which
constitutional issues are routinely engaged as empirical propositions.
Empiricism is both a method of constitutional interpretation and a
judicial perspective on the proper mission of the courts in
constitutional cases."83 Intimating a certain inescapability of adopting
this perspective, Zick contends that:
an outward, scientific turn was perhaps inevitable in
constitutional interpretation. Constitutional empiricism
represents that turn. Empiricism is only the latest judicial
effort to decide constitutional issues with reference to neutral
principles. Constitutional empiricism borrows liberally from
the principles and methods of scientific and empirical inquiry
80. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
81. Id. at 519.
82. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 118 (2003).
83. Id.
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to provide a purportedly neutral dynamic for constitutional
adjudication and construction."
The use of an empirical fact-finding approach for resolving
whether there is an actual problem in cases like Alvarez-does lying
about winning a medal harm the medal's reputation?-may carry
some theoretical benefits for constitutional law. Professor David
Faigman argued more than two decades ago that:
[e]mpirical research places an especially cogent check on
judicial decisionmaking by clarifying the factual premises
upon which legal judgments are based. If the Court rests a
legal judgment on a factual basis that empirical research
indicates does not exist, the Court must choose an alternative
basis to support the rule or suffer the slings and arrows of
critical comment.
The blind application, however, of an empirically grounded
judicial doctrine requiring proof of causation of harm to factual
scenarios in which it seems ill suited may call the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence into doubt. Some empirically rooted
judicial doctrines like that in Brown may, as Part II later argues,
provide an impossible barrier for the government to overcome in
seeking to justify restrictions on expression.
Professor Dan Kahan recently observed in the Harvard Law
Review that "[i]n cases involving sex equality, gay rights, the death
penalty, police seizures, drug testing, and other charged matters, the
Court has invoked empirical evidence-or sometimes the lack of it-
as warrant for its decisions."8 6 Unlike these phenomena, it may be
that all First Amendment speech scenarios do not readily lend
themselves to an empirical approach (at least, empiricism through a
quantitative social scientific lens like that deployed in Brown). Strict
scrutiny may be the correct doctrine for measuring the validity of
84. Id. at 220.
85. David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 612-13
(1991).
86. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term: Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems For Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1,
34 (2011).
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content-based statutes affecting expression." However, in its actual
implementation and operation, a direct causal link must be proven to
demonstrate a compelling interest might vary, depending on the
realities of whether such evidence is feasible to obtain.
Could it simply have been-when viewed cynically-that Justice
Kennedy deployed his empirical, direct-causal link methodology in
Alvarez to give the plurality (already a weak scenario, compared to a
majority) a seemingly safe place to hide when it protected incredibly
unpopular speech by an inveterate liar like Xavier Alvarez?
Professor Kahan, although writing before the decision in Alvarez was
handed down, contends that it is likely:
[T]he Court sometimes consciously resorts to empirical fact-
finding for strategic reasons. The Justices might well believe
that their decision-particularly if it is likely to disappoint one
side or the other on an issue that is the focus of cultural status
competition-will provoke less conflict, or impose less insult
on the losing side, if framed in the seemingly neutral idiom of
fact as opposed to the morally evocative idiom of
constitutional principle. The contribution empirical
arguments are thought to make to muting contested values is
part of their appeal in political discourse generally.'
While one admittedly doesn't know if this was, in any way, the
situation facing the four-justice plurality in Alvarez, what does seem
readily apparent is that Brown's proof-of-causation standard is not
necessarily a one-size-fits-all test for demonstrating actual problems
caused by speech. The next section shifts from the Supreme Court's
use of the proof-of-causation doctrine in Alvarez to its application by
some lower courts that have considered it.
B. Lower-Court Deployment of Brown
As asserted in the Introduction," Judge William Shubb's
December 2012 ruling in the SOCE case of Welch v. Brown' is
notable for its deployment of the proof-of-causation doctrine
87. See generally Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral
and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 598 (2003)
(observing that "[t]he entire class of content-based restrictions-whether or not they also
discriminate according to viewpoint-receive strict scrutiny").
88. Kahan, supra note 86, at 35.
89. See Part I, Section B, supra.
90. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172029 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012).
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articulated in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.91 In
particular, Judge Shubb initially determined that strict scrutiny was
the appropriate test to use to determine whether the First
Amendment speech rights of mental health providers who engage in
conversion therapy were violated by California's anti-SOCE law.'
Then, in interpreting and implementing the strict scrutiny standard,
Judge Shubb relied on Brown, citing it multiple times.93
California asserted that its compelling interest in prohibiting
SOCE for minors was to protect their physical and psychological well-
being from the harms allegedly caused by SOCE.94 Citing Brown,
Judge Shubb wrote that the California law "cannot withstand strict
scrutiny unless the state demonstrates an 'actual problem in need of
solving' and 'a direct causal link' between SOCE and harm to
minors."95 After a rigorous application of this standard, Judge Shubb
ultimately concluded that, "at most,"96 California could only
demonstrate that "SOCE may cause harm to minors."
In reaching this determination, he scrutinized' the scientific data
available to and reviewed by the American Psychological Association
in its 2009 "Report of the American Psychological Association Task
Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual
Orientation." 9 Shubb quoted the following passage from the report
to support his injunction against California's law:
We conclude that there is a dearth of scientifically sound
research on the safety of SOCE. Early and recent research
studies provide no clear indication of the prevalence of harmful
outcomes among people who have undergone efforts to
change their sexual orientation or the frequency of occurrence
of harm because no study to date of adequate scientific rigor
has been explicitly designed to do so. Thus, we cannot
91 . 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
92. Welch, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172029 (opining "that SB 1172 is subject to strict
scrutiny").
93. Id. at *3949.
94. Id. at *43.
95. Id. at *44 (quoting Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011)
(emphasis added)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. at *44-46.
99. See APA Report, supra note 6.
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conclude how likely it is that harm will occur from SOCE.
However, studies from both periods indicate that attempts to
change sexual orientation may cause or exacerbate distress
and poor mental health in some individuals, including
depression and suicidal thoughts."
Furthermore, while the California statute at issue in Welch
prohibited SOCE from being performed on minors, Judge Shubb
pointed out that "the studies discussed and criticized as incomplete in
the 2009 APA Report do not appear to have focused on harms to
minors."'o' He characterized it as "unclear whether the reports of
harm referenced in the 2009 APA Report were made exclusively by
adults."10 2
Judge Shubb also examined declarations by expert witnesses who
alleged that SOCE cause harm."3 Noting that one of California's
experts relied merely "on analysis performed of 'LGBT young adults,
ages 22 - 25' and her personal interviews with LGTB youth who
underwent SOCE,"'" Judge Shubb found critical the fact that "[n]one
of the experts . . . identify or rely on comprehensive studies that
adhere to scientific principles or address the inadequacies of the
studies discussed in the 2009 APA Report."105
With this in mind, and after emphasizing that "the Brown Court
rejected 'research based on correlation, not evidence of causation,""
Judge Shubb concluded that "evidence that SOCE 'may' cause harm
to minors based on questionable and scientifically incomplete studies
that may not have included minors is unlikely to satisfy the demands
of strict scrutiny."'O But Judge Shubb did not stop there in using
Brown to bludgeon California's law. He went on to focus on the
problem of controlling for other possible variables or factors that
could cause harm to gay minors-problems that might be conflated or
confused with the impact of SOCE.
"The Brown Court was also concerned with the state's inability
to prove that harm to minors was caused by video games as opposed
100. Id. at *44-45 (quoting APA report, supra note 6, at 44) (emphasis added).
101. Id. at *4546.
102. Id. at *46.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *47 (quoting Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735).
107. Id.
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to other sources of media,""'8 Judge Shubb wrote. In the case at bar,
he found that the "defendants face a similar inability to distinguish
between harm caused by SOCE versus other factors,"" such as
"societal stigmas, harassment and bullying, discrimination, and
rejection."no. Judge Shubb thus concluded that "[t]he few and
arguably incomplete studies addressing harms of SOCE do not
appear to have assessed whether the harms reported after undergoing
SOCE were caused by SOCE as opposed to other internal or external
factors and thus would have been sustained regardless of SOCE.""'
The bottom line from Welch, at least at the district court level, is
that Brown's demanding proof-of-causation doctrine, when
vigorously applied as it was by Judge Shubb, creates a very difficult
burden for states to overcome, especially when an authoritative
scientific and professional body like the American Psychological
Association"2 has issued a recent report openly admitting
shortcomings on the causation inquiry."' In the process, Judge Shubb
granted little deference to the legislature in its efforts to censor
speech.4
When compared to the factual scenario in Alvarez, the situation
in Welch initially appears to lend itself more easily to adopting
Brown's proof-of-causation doctrine. Specifically, both Brown and
Welch involved alleged harm to minors, rather than to inanimate
objects like military medals. In addition, scientific studies-flawed as
they might have been-were available in both Brown and Welch for
judicial assessment, while they were not in Alvarez. Where Brown
and Welch critically diverge, however, is the fact that the censored
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *48.
111. Id.
112. The APA describes itself as "the largest scientific and professional organization
representing psychology in the United States. APA is the world's largest association of
psychologists, with more than 134,000 researchers, educators, clinicians, consultants and
students as its members." About APA, American Psychological Association,
http://www.apa.org/about/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
113. Supra notes 6, 99-100 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Clay Calvert & Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or Not to Defer?
Deference and Its Differential Impact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court, 63
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 13 (2012) (providing a recent review of deference as applied in
selected First Amendment free speech cases decided during the tenure of current Chief
Justice John Roberts).
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expression in the latter case transpires within the context of a doctor-
patient relationship.
The U.S. Supreme Court held twenty-one years ago in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey"' that while
physicians do possess First Amendment speech rights (in Casey, a
right not to speak"') those rights come only "as part of the practice of
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State.""' Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs notes that "[l]ower courts
have uniformly interpreted Casey to apply a 'reasonable relationship'
test to claims by abortion providers that disclosure requirements
violate their free speech rights."" 8 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court opined in 2007 that "the State has a significant role to play in
regulating the medical profession."H9  Perhaps even more
significantly, Justice Anthony Kennedy observed at the time that
"[t]he Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to
pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific
uncertainty." 
120
If all of this is the case, then applying Brown's stringent proof-of-
causation doctrine may not be appropriate in cases like Welch. It
would seem that such cases involving physician speech would require
a more relaxed causation requirement. Ultimately, as with its use in
Alvarez, the deployment of the proof-of-causation doctrine in Welch
suggests the direct causal link requirement in Brown may not be not
exportable to all situations in which, at first glance, its application
seems appropriate.
Where might Brown's demanding test of causation of a harm
wrought by speech be appropriate? In a dissenting opinion in 2012 in
Wersal v. Sexton,12 1 Chief Judge William Jay Riley joined Circuit
Judge Beam in citing Brown's proof-of-causation requirements
115. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
116. See id. at 884 (writing that "[a]ll that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted
First Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of
abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician's
First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated") (emphasis added).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the
Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 855, 888 (2010).
119. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,157 (2007).
120. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
121. Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2012).
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approvingly in the context of a restriction on political speech.122
Wersal centered on the constitutionality of Minnesota laws affecting
the speech rights of judicial candidates.123 Judge Beam focused his
analysis on the privileged position political speech is given under the
First Amendment.124 In agreeing with the plurality and concurrence
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate test to measure the validity of
the state regulations,125 Judge Beam made it clear that Brown
demands a direct causal link be proven between speech and the
alleged interest at stake.126  Zeroing in on Minnesota's interest in
fostering judicial independence that allegedly is served by restricting
judicial endorsements of legislative or executive candidates, Judge
Beam wrote:
This is First Amendment protected electioneering activity that
may only be limited by application of the narrow tailoring
inquiry required by strict scrutiny. The question then
becomes does this ambiguous and virtually immeasurable
benefit somehow support the existence of a compelling state
interest? I think not. At least, Appellees have not presented
direct evidence (or any other evidence), as the Supreme Court
requires, that the purported interest addresses a problem "in
need of solving."l 27
What is interesting about this is that Judge Beam calls the
benefits from the law immeasurable, but nonetheless applies Brown's
test that requires measurement. If indeed political speech is at the
core of First Amendment protection 28 and, in turn, it demands the
122. See id. at 1040, n.25 (Beam, J., dissenting) (interpreting Brown to stand for the
proposition "that the government must show a 'direct causal link' between its regulation
and the purported harm it seeks to avoid and that the state 'bears the risk of uncertainty'
and 'ambiguous proof will not suffice"').
123. Id. at 1013-14.
124. Id. at 1039-40 (Beam, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1042.
126. See id. at 1048 (asserting that another judge in Wersal who authored a concurring
opinion "articulates no 'direct causal link' between the endorsement regulation and the
purported harm he seeks to avoid as required by Brown").
127. Id. at 1049 (Beam, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738).
128. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892 (2010)
(describing political speech as "central to the meaning and purpose of the First
Amendment").
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utmost protection, 29 then the application of a rigorous causation
doctrine like that in Brown to laws limiting political speech would
appear to make complete sense.
In October 2012, U.S. District Court Judge Rosemary M. Collyer
granted a permanent injunction and issued a final ruling stopping the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority from banning ads
on Metro subway platforms conveying the message, "In any war
between the civilized man and the savage, support the civilized man.
Support Israel. Defeat Jihad."'" After noting that the "ad contains
elements of both political and hate speech,"1 ' Judge Collyer
emphasized that "political speech receives the highest form of
protection under the First Amendment" 3 2 and determined that
censorship of the ad was a content-based restriction that could be
constitutional only if it passed muster under strict scrutiny.'33
In applying this standard, Judge Collyer quoted Justice
Kennedy's Alvarez rendition of Brown's causation requirement and
asserted that "a restriction on speech that is 'actually necessary' and
relies on 'a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the
injury to be prevented' might be approved."13 4
What is significant here is that Judge Collyer used this language
not to reject the government's assertion of a compelling interest in
the safety of the subway system's passengers and employees, but
rather to find the law was not narrowly tailored-that the law was not
"actually necessary" to serve the interest and thus was not narrowly
tailored.3"' This suggests that Brown and Alvarez, viewed collectively,
could create an exceedingly high burden of proving not only direct
causation of harm but also that the law in question is necessary to
prevent that harm from occurring. Does this mean that-in addition
to direct causal proof of a harm caused by speech-there must also be
a showing that alternative methods of alleviating the harm in question
would not be as effective as the one currently being deployed? Judge
Collyer did not say this was required, but such a double dose of direct
129. See id. at 898 (asserting that "political speech must prevail against laws that would
suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence," and pointing out that laws restricting
political speech must be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test).
130. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147052, *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2012).
131. Id. at *11.
132. Id. at *12.
133. Id. at *18-20.
134. Id. at *25-26 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012)).
135. Id. at *26-27.
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causal evidence in political speech cases like the one she addressed
would impose a daunting burden on the government.
Fewer than two years have passed since Brown was decided.
Thus, it is difficult to predict how the case's requirement of
unambiguous proof of direct causation of harm stemming from
speech-and, in turn, its rejection of empirical evidence of
correlation-ultimately will be applied in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Certainly, however, the Supreme Court's subsequent
use of Brown's logic just one year later in the very different factual
context of Alvarez may signal to some lower court jurists, as it did to
Judge Shubb in Welch, that it is not limited to cases involving media
products like video games.
This Part has pointed out multiple problems with such an
expansion into different factual realms. It may be that the term
"direct causal link" is a legal term of art-a phrase under which the
word "causal" does not mean "causation" as social scientists
understand it-or one that courts apply with flexibility to fit the
factual situations before them. Judge Shubb certainly applied the
notion of proof-of-causation of harm in Welch in its most empirical
and rigorous sense.
With this in mind, part III now turns to the relationship between
Brown's proof-of-causation doctrine and the First Amendment
theory of the marketplace of ideas. The next part also suggests that a
pure, empirical understanding of causation of harm cannot resolve
the thorny normative questions that rise up in First Amendment
jurisprudence, even when speech-caused harm is readily apparent.
III. STANDING AT THE INTERSECTION OF THEORY AND
DOCTRINE: HOW THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS THEORY
SQUARES WITH BROWN
If Brown's proof-of-causation standard, with its rigorous direct-
causal-link requirement, is to become established First Amendment
doctrine within the context of strict scrutiny analysis, then it is useful
to examine how it may or may not comport or jibe with traditional
First Amendment theories and values. After all, as Professor Robert
Post writes, a key goal of doctrine is "to implement the objectives
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attributed by theory to the Constitution.""' This Part examines the
proof-of-causation standard in relation to one venerable theory, the
marketplace of ideas.
Despite multiple flaws' that have led at least one scholar to dub
it a "false god,"'3 the marketplace of ideas theory is a key model for
much of the U.S. Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence.'
Although the "direct causal link" approach to speech-based harms is
not necessarily mandated by the marketplace theory, it arguably
derives significant support from that theory.
The marketplace of ideas theory ultimately is about both the
search for truth'40 and the process of constantly testing and
challenging accepted notions of what is true.141 In other words, both
the product-truth-and the process-testing of conceptions of the
truth-are pivotal under this theory. Without both open discussion
and a vibrant system of freedom of expression, the search for truth
136. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 153 (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds. 2002).
137. See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984) (providing an excellent critique of the marketplace of ideas
theory).
138. Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the
Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 708 (2006).
139. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15
(1982) (writing that, of all free speech justifications, "the predominant and most
persevering has been the argument that free speech is particularly valuable because it
leads to the discovery of truth"); Jeremy J. Ofseyer, First Amendment Law: Taking
Liberties with John Stuart Mill, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 395, 395 (1999) (writing that
"John Stuart Mill's classic, On Liberty, remains at the heart of judicial and scholarly
accounts of the purpose and extent of freedom of speech. The Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence is widely viewed as highly indebted to it.").
140. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to
the Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61, 61 (Lee
C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (observing that under one of the three
primary rationales for protecting expression in First Amendment jurisprudence, free
speech is viewed as "the foundational mechanism of the search for truth, at both the
individual and the societal levels. In this view, a free 'marketplace of ideas' produces a
more accurate, probing, and richly textured understanding of fact and value than can any
prescribed orthodoxy").
141. See SMOLLA, supra note 41, at 9 (observing that for Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., "the benefit of the marketplace was not the end but the quest, not the
market's capacity to arrive at final and ultimate truth but rather the integrity of the
process") (emphasis in original); Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An
Examination of John Stuart Mill's and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's Free Speech
Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 40 (2010) (asserting that "Holmes is primarily
concerned with a process in which those who hold minority views are given a fighting
chance to win over a critical mass and grow into a dominant force") (emphasis added).
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becomes impossible.142 Thus, marketplace adherents argue,
government should avoid regulation of expression that would inhibit
this all-important human activity.
John Milton's Areopagitica, one of the earliest defenses of this
model,143 famously framed the theory as follows: "Let [Truth] and
Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free
and open encounter?"'" British utilitarian John Stuart Mill later
provided the early philosophical heft for the marketplace theory with
his 1859 elaboration of the theory in On Liberty.'45
But it was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who placed
marketplace theory squarely in the early development of modern
First Amendment doctrine with his powerful 1919 dissent in Abrams
v. United States.146 As Professor Robert Post writes, Holmes "virtually
invented both First Amendment theory and First Amendment
doctrine. He advanced the theory of the marketplace of ideas, and he
demonstrated how doctrine would have to evolve to implement this
new theory."147 Holmes's Abrams dissent, which took issue with the
majority's analysis of antiwar leaflets under the reigning bad tendency
test,148 instead argued that:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or
your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition. . . . But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
142. Cf Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 967-68 (2009) (asserting that under the marketplace place
of ideas metaphor, "[e]ven if robust debate fails to lead to the discovery of truth per se, it
can lead to knowledge and the best perspectives or solutions for societal problems. At the
very least, open debate allows for better informed decision-making").
143. See 0. Lee Reed, A Free Speech Metavalue for the Next Millennium: Autonomy of
Consciousness in First Amendment Theory and Practice, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (1997)
(asserting that "[t]o advance free speech, poet John Milton marshaled his considerable
powers of metaphor and represented speech as a battle of clashing armies of truth and
falsehood with the value of truth emerging victorious from the fray").
144. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION 50 (George H. Sabine, ed.
1987) (1644).
145. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Crofts Classics 1947) (1859).
146. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
147. Post, supra note 136 at 153.
148. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (describing the "bad tendency" test).
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more than they believe the foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . ..4
Soon after Holmes's dissent in Abrams in 1919, "the marketplace
metaphor came to dominate the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence." 0 Now, nearly a full century later, the marketplace
theory arguably provides a powerful justification for the "direct
causal link" approach of Brown and Alvarez.
In particular, if the marketplace of ideas is about a constant
search for the truth, then the judiciary must ask: (1) whether, in
Brown, it is "true" that playing violent video games causes harm to
minors; and (2) whether, in Alvarez, it is "true" that lying about
military medals causes harm to their integrity. What, in other words,
is the "truth" about playing video games and lying about medals? In
the former case, the competing ideas and claims within the social
scientific community regarding video games have yet to resolve what
the truth is, at least according to the Brown majority."'
Without empirical proof of the "truth" that playing violent video
games causes harm (per Brown's direct causal link standard), then all
we are left with are different opinions about whether violent video
games are harmful. In turn, under the marketplace theory all
opinions regarding harm and the lack thereof must be protected and
allowed to compete freely. Allowing the government to censor video
games based merely on its own opinion about harm, rather than on a
demonstrably provable fact of harm, would be tantamount to allowing
the government's version of the truth to trump others.
Of course, Oliver Wendell Holmes was a skeptic about absolute
truths within the marketplace of ideas. First Amendment scholar
Rodney Smolla writes that "Holmes did not believe in truth."'
Professor Vincent Blasi concurs, noting that Holmes "displayed an
instinctive aversion to assertions of 'absolute' truth."153
149. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
150. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 830
(2008).
151. Justice Scalia noted for the majority that even Justice Stephen Breyer, who wrote
a dissent in favor of the California legislation, "admits he cannot say whether the studies
on his side are right or wrong." Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739, n.8
(2011).
152. SMOLLA, supra note 41, at 8.
153. Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 14
(2004).
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In this regard, when invoking the marketplace metaphor in
Abrams, Holmes wrote that "we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge."" This reflects his
earlier sentiment from The Path of the Law address in 1897 that
"certainty generally is illusion." 15
Viewed collectively, this suggests that while Holmes might
tolerate California's censorial video game law if it could be justified
by some level of proof of harm falling just slightly short of absolute
attestation, he also would demand future reexamination of the law on
a recurrent basis as new data emerge. Put differently, today's truth
about causation of speech-based harms may prove false in the future,
requiring the judiciary to reassess speech-restrictive laws again and
again. This flows both from the marketplace of ideas' privileging the
process of testing accepted truths' and John Stuart Mill's observation
that it is a "fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a
thing when it is no longer doubtful.""'
Furthermore, Holmes might have appreciated the empirical
approach to causation served up by the majority in Brown, given his
assertion more than a century ago that "[f]or the rational study of the
law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man
of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics."'5 8 In
a separate article, Holmes wrote that "[tihe growth of education is an
increase in the knowledge of measure. To use words familiar to logic
and to science, it is a substitution of quantitative for qualitative
judgments."'
In fact, Holmes is well known for his belief "that lawyers and
legal scholars should employ an empirical rather than a deductive
method,"'" and "Holmes believed that knowledge of the social
sciences was essential to sound legal decision making." 61  Both
Holmes and Mill, as Professor Vincent Blasi asserts, embraced a
154. United States v. Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
155. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897).
156. Supra note 138 and accompanying text.
157. MILL, supra note 146, at 43.
158. Holmes, supra note 156, at 469.
159. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV.
443, 456 (1899) (emphasis added).
160. Catharine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal Method: The Predictive Theory of Law
as an Instance of Scientific Method, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 329, 329 (1994).
161. Id. at 335.
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scientific approach to truth, under which all current scientific truths
are fallible and thus subject to future debunking. 16 2 Again, this is a
free speech friendly approach as it relates to causation because it
suggests that social science evidence demonstrating a direct causal
link of harm today must be reevaluated in the future; speech
restrictive laws cannot live on in perpetuity in the face of new causal
"truths."
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Alvarez deploying the
"direct causal link""' test from Brown is, in fact, rich with
marketplace of ideas imagery. Kennedy actually quoted Holmes's
dissent in Abrams, writing that "the theory of our Constitution is 'that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market.".. Kennedy added that
"suppression of speech by the government can make exposure of
falsity more difficult, not less so. Society has the right and civic duty
to engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse."'65 Rebuffing the
government's attempt to intervene in the speech marketplace
surrounding military medals, Justice Kennedy opined in a rich
rhetorical flourish:
The American people do not need the assistance of a
government prosecution to express their high regard for the
special place that military heroes hold in our tradition. Only a
weak society needs government protection or intervention
162. Blasi writes:
As a young man, Holmes studied the writings of John Stuart Mill,
particularly his influential account of the scientific method, A System of
Logic. That book can be viewed as the culmination of the British
empiricist tradition in philosophy, stretching back to Locke and Hume.
A key tenet of that tradition is that all propositions are subject to
perpetual testing. And that process of testing, whether it takes the form
of systematic observation, controlled experiment, logical derivation, or
probabilistic calculation, must always hold out at least the possibility that
prior understandings will be displaced. Time, after all, has upset many
scientific laws. In short, no matter how elegant and coherent the
explanation and supportive the current data, we might be wrong.
Blasi, supra note 154 at 19.
163. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012).
164. Id. at 2550 (quoting United States v. Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
165. Id.
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before it pursues its resolve to preserve the truth. Truth needs
neither handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication.'66
In brief, the plurality opinion in Alvarez represents a seamless
melding of the direct causal link doctrine with the marketplace of
ideas theory. That is the case despite the gaping chasm of factual
differences separating Alvarez from Brown, in which the doctrine was
first deployed.
Ultimately, however, the marketplace theory itself often does not
provide a precise account of the limits of the theory-that is, at what
point does the dangerousness or harm of speech justify its limitation?
Mill himself is famous for his so-called "harm principle," which limits
the state's ability to interfere with liberty to situations in which the
state is preventing harm to other persons, not to the person speaking
or acting. As Mill put it, "the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others."'67 But Mill's harm
principle, as commentators have noted, provides little in the way of
specifics as to how the principle applies to the regulation of
expression." Similarly, Justice Holmes's articulation of the clear and
present danger test"' has been subject to a variety of interpretations
over the years, culminating fifty years later with its reformulation in
Brandenburg v. Ohio.'
166. Id. at 2550-51.
167. MILL, supra note 142, at 9.
168. Jeremy J. Ofseyer, First Amendment Law: Taking Liberties with John Stuart Mill,
1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 395, 400-401 (1999). See also Richard Vernon, John Stuart Mill
and Pornography: Beyond the Harm Principle, in VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, 383, 387 (2006) (arguing that "if we expect a harm principle to tell us what
Mill thinks should and should not be prohibited, we will be bitterly disappointed by what
follows in his essay. . .").
169. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (asserting that "[t]he
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree").
170. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the
Brandenburg test); see also Susan M. Gilles, Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An
"Accidental," "Too Easy," and "Incomplete" Landmark Case, 38 CAP. U.L. REV. 517,
520-521 (2010) (noting that "Brandenburg is famous for abandoning the 'clear and present
danger' test, a test so famous that it has the dubious honor of having a bad movie named
after it," and asserting that "part of Brandenburg's claim to fame ... is that it ended the
reign of the clear and present danger test").
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What the U.S. Supreme Court apparently is doing in both Brown
and Alvarez is moving the often-amorphous determination of harm
caused by speech into an empirical realm. This has not been the
standard approach in strict scrutiny cases; in the recent past, it was
common for courts to identify a "compelling interest" at a very
abstract level and then avoid discussion of the actual harm the speech
purportedly caused in the case at bar."' If the Brown approach to
causation becomes the new method for applying strict scrutiny (or
perhaps a new method, deployed in some as-yet unspecified subset of
speech cases factually akin to Brown), then the older model of
assuming harm based on highly abstract compelling interests would
no longer be viable.
There are a number of examples of this shift or movement
toward demanding greater proof of harm in other areas of speech law.
For instance, the common law of defamation allowed recovery of
reputational damages without proof of actual harm, a principle
known as presumed damages... that some jurisdictions continue to
follow today.'73 As the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in 1974, "[u]nder
the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of
injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Juries may award
substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation
without any proof that such harm actually occurred." 4 The Court
added that "[it] is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do
not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to
compensation for actual injury.""'
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have gone so
far as to opine that the rule is now "one who is liable for a defamatory
communication is liable for the proved, actual harm caused to the
reputation of the person defamed." 6 Although the Restatement's
171. See Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First
Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL'Y 349, 369-
372 (2011) (discussing the level of generality problem in First Amendment strict scrutiny
cases).
172. See Meiring De Villiers, Quantitative Proof of Reputational Harm, 15 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 567, 573 (2010) (observing that "[u]nder the presumed damages rule, no
proof of reputational harm is required").
173. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION 2-62 (3d ed. 1999).
174. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (emphasis added).
175. Id.
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 (1977) (emphasis added). The
American Law Institute noted a caveat to that rule, stating that it "takes no position on
whether the traditional common law rule allowing recovery in the absence of proof of
actual harm, for the harm that normally results from such a defamation, may
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view is criticized by some commentators as inaccurate'" and despite
the unsettled state of defamation law in this area, proof of actual
harm is more frequently required in that somewhat benighted zone of
tort law178 than was previously the case.
Similarly, commercial speech jurisprudence'. has undergone what
has been described as a "data-driven trajectory," in which the Court
has required an increasingly rigorous demonstration that harms
supposedly caused by advertising are real and that government
regulation will avert them. " In the 1980 case of Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,"'1 the Supreme Court
first established an intermediate-scrutiny-based test to regulate
advertising. As the Court formulated that test:
For commercial speech to come within [the First
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.182
constitutionally be applied if the defendant knew of the falsity of the communication or
acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." Id.
177. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047,
1054 (2006) (writing that the Restatement view "turns out to be erroneous, or at least
misleading; the subsequent decisions still permit presumed harm when actual malice is
shown").
178. Kevin P. Allen, The Oddity and Odyssey of Presumed Damages in Defamation
Actions Under Pennsylvania Law, 42 DUO. L. REV. 495, 495 (2004) (writing that "[i]n
1974, the United States Supreme Court described defamation law as an 'oddity of tort law'
because of the concept of 'presumed damages,' which permitted defamation plaintiffs to
recover damages even when they could not prove that they actually suffered any harm")
(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974), a case in which the Court
limited the availability of presumed damages in light of First Amendment concerns).
179. United States v. Caronia, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 24831, *31 (2d Cir. Dec. 3,
2012) (noting that "non-content-based regulation and regulation of commercial speech-
expression solely related to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience-are
subject to intermediate scrutiny").
180. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Free Speech, Fleeting Expletives, and the
Causation Quagmire: Was Justice Scalia Wrong in Fox Television Stations?, 47 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 737, 765 (2010).
181. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
182. Id. at 566.
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The third prong of the test-the regulation must directly advance
the government's interest-has been the site of the Court's
increasingly rigorous demand for proof that the speech causes harm
and that the government's regulation is actually effective in
preventing that harm. In the early stages of the test's development,
the Court required very little in the way of empirical proof of harm
and regulatory efficacy. For example, in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court actually
based its analysis, in part, on the fact that the defendant advertiser
had actually litigated the case all the way to the Court.183 As one
commentator described this odd analysis, "since the person whose
speech is banned has brought the case before the Supreme Court, the
ban likely passes the third part of the test. 'Catch-22,' precisely."'
However, by the 1990s, the Court began to jettison its
impressionistic analysis in Posadas and significantly raised the
empirical bar. For example, in Edenfield v. Fane,'" the Court in 1993
demanded proof that a rule forbidding accountants to directly solicit
clients satisfied the third prong of Central Hudson. It pointed out
that "this burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture;
rather, a governmental body . .. must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree.'"' The Court's commercial speech jurisprudence has
continued to emphasize these themes.
For example, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly17 the Court
repeated that governmental entities wishing to regulate advertising
"must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.""
Interestingly, the empirical emphasis in Brown appears to have
percolated up from the lower tier of intermediate scrutiny applicable
in commercial speech cases,"' rather than the reverse.
183. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 342
(1986).
184. P. CAMERON DEVORE & ROBERT D. SACK, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE 4-22 (1999).
185. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
186. Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added).
187. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
188. Id. at 555 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (emphasis
added)).
189. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339
(2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has held "that restrictions on nonmisleading
commercial speech regarding lawful activity must withstand intermediate scrutiny")
(emphasis added).
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While empiricism per se is not necessarily a problem in First
Amendment adjudication, standing alone it certainly is not a
sufficient basis on which to resolve all free speech disputes. Why not
assert that a free marketplace of ideas can only be protected when the
government must empirically demonstrate a direct causal link
between speech and harm before speech can be regulated? One issue
that must be teased out, however, is the nature of the proposition at
issue.
The late Professor Steven G. Gey drew a useful dichotomy
between normative disagreements, about which empirical evidence is
unavailable, and factual disputes, which, at least in principle, can be
resolved empirically-even if procuring that empirical evidence
proves tremendously difficult.'9 The Brown direct causal link
approach might constitute an appropriate, if daunting, bar in a case
that involves a relatively straightforward factual question. For
example, do violent video games cause children to act aggressively or
violently? This is an enormously difficult question to resolve
definitively through social scientific research, yet, in principle, it has
an answer that can be explored empirically.
However, conflating this kind of data-driven standard with more
normative inquiries is problematic. There may well be numerous
speech situations in which harm, standing alone, simply is not the
major determinant of whether speech should be protected by the First
Amendment. Instead, normative and intangible considerations about
the value of speech, even if it is harmful, may prevail. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes acknowledged in 1899 that "in the law we only
occasionally can reach an absolutely final and quantitative
determination, because the worth of the competing social ends which
respectively solicit a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant
cannot be reduced to number and accurately fixed."' 91
Consider, for example, Snyder v. Phelps,'" a 2011 decision in
which the Supreme Court shielded members of the Westboro Baptist
Church ("WBC") from civil liability for intentional infliction of
190. Steven G. Gey, Papers From the First Amendment Discussion Group: The First
Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 8-9 (2008). As Gey writes, factual disputes "can be resolved through the use of
ordinary resources available to assess objective reality." Id. at 9.
191. Holmes, supra note 156, at 456.
192. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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emotional distress ("IIED")193 and related claims for their activities in
protesting near a military funeral.'94 Fred Phelps, founder of the
WBC, and six fellow congregants'9 picketed the funeral of Marine
Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, with slogan-emblazoned signs such
as "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," and "Fags Doom Nations,"
expressing the WBC's theological view that God hates the United
States and its military because of the country's policies tolerating
homosexuality. 9 6 Albert Snyder, the deceased soldier's father, sued
the WBC, alleging he was "unable to separate the thought of his dead
son from his thoughts of Westboro's picketing, and that he often
becomes tearful, angry, and physically ill when he thinks about it."197
His claims of harm caused by the speech were buttressed by expert
witnesses who "testified that Snyder's emotional anguish had resulted
in severe depression."1 98
The Supreme Court, in turn, recognized significant harm directly
caused by the speech. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the
majority that "the applicable legal term-'emotional distress'-fails
to capture fully the anguish that Westboro's choice added to Mr.
Snyder's already incalculable grief."'" Roberts added that the speech
did, in fact, "inflict great pain."2W Despite such a clear
acknowledgment of harm, however, the mere fact of harm itself did
not answer the ultimate normative question of whether the speech
should be protected. Here the Chief Justice wrote:
[W]e cannot react to that pain [suffered by Albert Snyder] by
punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a
different course-to protect even hurtful speech on public
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That
193. The IIED tort typically "consists of four elements: (1) the defendant's conduct
must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable, (3)
the defendant's conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the distress
must be severe." Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress as a Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL'Y 469, 476 (2000).
194. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213 (the members of the WBC were standing "within a
10- by 25-foot plot of public land adjacent to a public street, behind a temporary fence"
and located "approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held.").
195. See id. at 1213 (noting that Fred "Phelps became aware of Matthew Snyder's
funeral and decided to travel to Maryland with six other Westboro Baptist parishioners
(two of his daughters and four of his grandchildren) to picket.").
196. Id. at 1213.
197. Id. at 1214.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1218.
200. Id. at 1220.
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choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for
its picketing in this case.201
Why, then, does the quantification of harm matter? One answer
may be that certain speech controversies fall more clearly within the
classic marketplace of ideas framework, and thus some level of harm
is simply accepted as the collateral damage necessary to preserve a
robust marketplace. Snyder, as the pull quote above suggests, is such
a case. The WBC's message, as bizarre and disturbing as it may be, is
a classic political-religious idea deserving full protection even when it
causes significant harm. The belief held by WBC members that God
is punishing the U.S. military for the country's domestic policy on
gays and lesbians is a broad normative indictment of society and its
laws.20
In Snyder, the outcome hinged not on whether there was proof of
harm caused by speech-the majority made it clear it believed the
speech caused harm to Albert Snyder2 03-but rather on normative
concerns about protecting political and religious expression. As Chief
Justice Roberts wrote, "[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits
holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on
whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by
all the circumstances of the case." 204 When it comes to normative
disputes about what Gey terms "social morality" 205 and "political
policy" 206-the type of topics at issue in Snyder-" [e]mpirical proof is
not available." 207
Brown, on the other hand, did not involve a specific video game
that carried a particular viewpoint or message in the classic
marketplace sense. Instead, a broad regulation that affected all
games, divorced from any ideas they might or might not contain,
required that the Court make some assessment of the level of harm
inflicted. Similarly, Alvarez really did not involve an "idea" in the
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1217 (writing that the WBC's signs "are matters of public import"
because they highlight "the political and moral conduct of the United States and its
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the
Catholic clergy").
203. Supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
204. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215.
205. Gey, supra note 188, at 8.
206. Id. at 8.
207. Id.
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Millian sense. Xavier Alvarez himself was not expressing a view on
the value of heroism or the worth of military medals. Instead, he was
simply engaging in a false statement that he had been awarded a
Congressional Medal of Honor. Again, the case really wasn't about
any particular idea that the marketplace theory might protect. One
might argue that in cases where the "idea" element is lacking, a more
direct assessment of harm is the appropriate methodology,
augmented by the Court's strong empirical turn in First Amendment
law.
IV.Conclusion
As Part II made clear, the deployment of the phrase "direct
causal link" within the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence has only occurred twice-once in 2011 in Brown, and
again in 2012 in Alvarez. It is a truly nascent concept within this
context. If it does, indeed, reflect a rigorous proof-of-causation
doctrine as used in those two cases and as interpreted by lower courts
in disputes like Welch v. Brown,208 the phrase "direct causal link" will
provide formidable protection for a wide range of speech activities. It
is, at bottom, a free speech friendly test. Without proof of a direct
causal link between speech and harm, there simply is no "'actual
problem' in need of solving." 209
On the other hand, as Part II suggested, demanding proof of
causation of harm under Brown in very different factual situations
like Alvarez may not always make sense. Professor Post notes that,
within the realm of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court often "formulate[s] doctrinal standards that frame incoherent
and unanswerable questions." 210  Is it possible to answer,
unambiguously and with direct causal proof-not merely
correlational evidence-the question of whether lies about military
medals harm those medals' integrity?
Courts considering whether to use Brown's proof-of-causation
test might ask themselves several questions. For instance, a court
might query whether the alleged harm at issue is so egregious as to
not require empirical proof. In other words, could the gravity of the
alleged evil purportedly caused by speech be so great that the
208. See Part II, Section B, supra and accompanying text (addressing Welch v. Brown).
209. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529
U.S. 803, 822 (2000)).
210. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1271 (1995).
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government is given more slack or wiggle room on proving direct
causation of injury?
Courts might also ask whether the case at bar is one in which
empirical causal data simply is difficult, if not impossible, to gather or
generate. Recall here from earlier in the article 211 Justice Scalia's
assertion in Fox Television Stations that "[t]here are some
propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled." 212
Finally, as Part II suggested, the direct causal link test cannot
resolve normative questions about the value of speech in cases like
Snyder v. Phelps where the Supreme Court conceded harm was
suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, courts must consider whether the case
at bar is one in which normative considerations trump those involving
causation of harm. Empirical data cannot, standing alone, resolve the
normative issues.
Ultimately, only time will tell if the "direct causal link" approach
first embraced in Brown and then extended to a very different factual
scenario the following year in Alvarez will continue to be deployed
and, if so, in what circumstances. The very meaning of the term itself
remains to be sorted out by the Court; perhaps it does not always
require empirical data, depending upon the facts of a case or the
egregiousness of the alleged harm. All of this uncertainty at this stage
is not surprising, as Professor Vincent Blasi reminds us that
"[d]octrine building is a complex endeavor that, when done well,
takes into account a host of practical and institutional considerations
in addition to the underlying justifications."213 Ironically, then, a test
that was designed in Brown to ferret out whether there an is "actual
problem"214 caused by speech may itself become an actual problem for
First Amendment jurisprudence if its meaning and deployment are
not carefully considered.
211. FCC v. Fox Television Stationss, Inc., 556 U.S. at 519
212. Id.
213. Blasi, supra note 138, at 63.
214. Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
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